Which Census? Constitutional Implications of the Delimitation Amendment

Federalism in India has always been contentious. So much so, that a member of the Constituent Assembly as far back as June 1949 thought delimitation of constituencies to be the very ‘soul’ of elections in the country. He also worried that ‘a little apathy’ and ‘some ill-adjustment’ in the delimitation exercise could ‘work much havoc’ and leave minorities with even less representation than their population would ordinarily allow.

The current Lok Sabha has exhibited comparable caution. A special session of Parliament earlier this year saw the Constitution (131^st Amendment) Bill, 2026 fail to secure the support of a two-thirds majority despite efforts by the ruling party to build cross-party consensus on it. And the government is yet to introduce the Bill again in the ongoing Monsoon Session, even as dialogue on the issue continues amidst political leaders outside Parliament. Lack of support is not necessarily attributable purely to party competition – our previous blog post observes that constitutional amendments notified after 1990 have all relied on cross-party/coalition support to be passed.

Broadening Parliament’s Powers on Delimitation

Part of what makes the Bill contentious is the breadth of changes it proposes. For one, it proposes to increase the strength of the Lok Sabha from 550 to 850 by amending clause (1) of Article 81 of the Constitution. For another, it advances the operation of the one-third reservation of seats for women in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies promised in the Constitution (106^th Amendment) Act, 2023.

Most significantly, however, it proposes to change the nature of the power to determine which census may be used for allotment of seats in Parliament among States and Union Territories. The existing Constitutional position, emerging from clause (3) of Article 81 and clause (1) of Article 82, is that allotment of seats among States must be based on the ‘last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published’. Any deviations from this rule can only be made through a constitutional amendment. This was done, for instance, through the Constitution (84^th Amendment) Bill, 2002, to freeze the relevant census under this provision to mean the 1971 Census. Under the 2026 Amendment Bill, however, Parliament can determine the census for each delimitation exercise hereafter without a further constitutional amendment.

The immediate impact of this proposed amendment is that it allows for the next delimitation exercise to be conducted on the basis of the 2011 census instead of the 1971 census. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill justifies this by stating that the country’s demographic profile has undergone substantial changes since 1971, including ‘inter-State and intra-State population shifts, rapid urbanisation and migration, and disproportionate growth in certain regions, resulting in wide disparities in the population and the constituencies’.

This does not, however, throw light on the rationale for loosening the rule on Parliament’s power to determine the census to be used for delimitation itself.

Early Discomfort on Legislative Powers of Delimitation

Discomfort with a legislative body holding significant powers in relation to delimitation appeared early in the drafting history of the Constitution. As the Constituent Assembly discussed the Report of the Provincial Constitution Committee (27 June 1947) on 18 July 1947 – an early draft of a model constitution for the provincial governments – the issue of whether to allow provincial legislatures to make laws on delimitation came up.

As the report allowed provincial legislatures this power, K Santhanam, a Congress member from Madras, cautioned against it. Stressing the need for this to only be allowed through constitutional amendment, he observed:

“As the clause now stands, by a mere ordinary law such important matters as the delimitations of territorial constituencies and the qualifications for the franchise and the preparation of electoral rolls can be altered. It will mean that by a snatch vote a simple majority can upset the entire basis of the Provincial Constitution; it can gerrymander constituencies and make changes so that it can dissolve the House and come back to power, in a larger majority. Therefore some restrictions are needed. I suggest these changes should be made, only in accordance with the procedure for amending the Provincial Constitution. […] Whatever that may be, these matters should be changed only by the procedure specially prescribed in that behalf. They should not be changed by ordinary legislation.”

The Deliberate Specification of ‘Last Preceding Census’

By 1949, the Assembly had decided to allow Parliament to make laws on delimitation – but with one important limitation. This was the specification, conveyed in the words ‘as ascertained in the last preceding census’ in draft Article 67(5) (corresponding to Article 81(1)(c) in the Constitution of India 1950, and Article 81(3) presently) that the exercise of delimitation must be based on the latest census at the time of the exercise.

This was a deliberate inclusion: an amendment was moved and adopted on 4^th January 1949 specifically to clarify this wording. It was accompanied by the assumptions that census would be a decennial exercise, and that it was likely that elections may need to be held ‘almost immediately after a census’. Several members, including Thakur Das Bhargava, Biswanath Das and Deshbandhu Gupta stressed the importance of the recency rule in the context of Partition, which necessitated a new census before the first general election to reflect population changes in East Punjab, West Bengal and Delhi in the intervening years.

A ‘Matter for the Constitution and not for the Parliament’

One of the other provisions in draft Article 67 was that it allowed Parliament to determine the allotment of seats in the Lok Sabha for territories other than States. Conferring even this limited power to determine rules on seat allocation to Parliament caused some discomfort in the Assembly. Shibban Lal Saxena, a Congress member from the United Provinces, observed:

“This is a matter for the Constitution and not for the Parliament. Parliament may always try to make laws in favour of the party which is in power. Parliament should be debarred from making laws in respect of such matters. I think clause (7) should be deleted, because it gives to Parliament the power of creating additional seats in the House of the People.”

This provision was included in Article 81 at the time of adoption of the Constitution, but was subsequently removed through amendment. Article 81(1)(b) now provides for a cap on the number of Lok Sabha seats that can be allotted to Union Territories.

Tilting the Balance of Delimitation Powers

The Constitution therefore strikes a balance: it leaves Parliament with the power to legislate on the delimitation exercise, but prescribes at least one significant limit upon that power – that such an exercise must be based on the last preceding census of which the relevant figures are published at the time of the exercise. To allow Parliament full liberty to choose the census for any delimitation exercise tilts this balance away from constitutional restraint on Parliament’s power.

[Assisted by Chrisma Gabriela]