Santokh Singh - 'An Outline of a Constitution Suited to Indian Conditions'

AN OUTLINE 

OF 

A CONSTITUTION 

SUITED TO INDIAN CONDITIONS. 

BY 

Santokh Singh of Shahkot M.A. (Oxon);
B.Sc. (Pb.); Dip. Rur. Econ. (Oxford). 

Secretary Panthic Darbar. 

HOLLY-OAK,
SIMLA
16th August, 1948. 

ARMY PRESS, PATIALA 

Dear Sir, 

 After having perused Article 22 of Part III relating to Fundamental Rights I submit herewith my- reaction. 

AN OUTLINE OF A CONSTITUTION SUITED TO INDIAN CONDITIONS 

BY 

Santokh Singh of Shahkot M.A. (Oxon);
B.Sc. (Pb.); DIP. Rur. Econ. (Oxford).
Secretary Panthic Darbar. 

India has attained her freedom, and the great prob[unclear] which faces us now is the framing of a constitution [unclear]able to our self-government. There are many types [unclear]ine constitutions in the world today, but each has [unclear]n evolved according to the special social, historical, geographical conditions peculiar to a particular [unclear]ion or people. Whether one of these would be suit[unclear]e to India, or whether we should endeavor to introduce [unclear]ew concept adapted to our special conditions, are [unclear]stions which we must consider now. It is my opinion [unclear]t the conditions of our country are such that some [unclear] concepts must be introduced into our constitution if would assure it a steady progress, while pre[unclear]ing the possibility of drastic and dangerous [unclear]ercussions. 

The Indian National Congress has often reiterated [unclear]t it is pledged to establish a responsible government the country suited to Indian conditions. But the [unclear]sent constitution, as proposed by the Constituent [unclear]sembly, does not appear to fulfil this pledge. First of, therefore, we must examine the social, historical, and [unclear]ographical nature of our country, and the desires and [unclear]victions which motivate the actions of its people, that our constitution may be framed around these [unclear]nciples. No one can deny that the great majority of [unclear]r people are illiterate and quite unaccustomed to any [unclear]stem of democratic government. They maintain, [unclear]stead, a deep respect for, and loyalty to, the ancient [unclear]d traditional institution of monarchy; government to [unclear]e people has been personified in the figure of one man, [unclear]e leader to whom they owed their love and their [unclear]legiance. The Ruler and the Ruled were the only [unclear]o concepts which had any significance for them, a psychological factor which we cannot completely ignor[unclear] in the framing of a constitution suited to our people. 

Not-withstanding our tradition of monarchy, there is amongst ourselves, an indisputable tendency to develop on democratic lines. We have strong desire to evolve [unclear] responsible type of government, not by slavishly following any one of the systems of the West, but by adaptin[unclear] democratic principles to an Eastern pattern. Certai[unclear] misunderstood democratic ideas have certainly prejudice[unclear] our thinking, through our imperfect contact with th[unclear] West; these must be studied and clearly understoo[unclear] before we accept their introduction into our form o[unclear] government. We should, of course, admire all that i[unclear] good in the democratic systems of the world, but w[unclear] must not ignore our own background, and the fine trad[unclear] tions that are our national heritage, which must b[unclear] considered in any government framed to suit existin[unclear] conditions. 

A highly democratic system of the western typ[unclear] might be suited theoretically to the needs of our people or to any people anywhere, but we must bear in min[unclear]  that a true government of the people cannot be evolve[unclear] overnight; there can be no true democracy unless th[unclear] electorate is generally well-educated in social an[unclear] political thought. There is no reason to believe tha[unclear] our people will not, after some years of training an[unclear] experience, be able to attain true self-government but we are not yet prepared to delegate grea[unclear] powers to a body of men untrained and unqualified to use them. To attempt to do so at this time would b[unclear] running the grave risk of allowing power to fall into th[unclear] hands of men not only inexperienced and insufficiently trained for the responsibility imposed on them under a democratic system of government, but possibly even morally illequiped to serve the people without fear or favour, and without self interest. If such a blunder should be made at the very outset of Indian self-government, the results to the orderly development of our country might well be disastrous. 

Barring some honorable exceptions, the would-be administrators of Indian government today are far more concerned with self-advancement, and the consolidation of party gains, than they are in representing the true interests of the people whom they are elected to serve; the country’s welfare, so much talked about at election time, in the press, and through manifestos, is thrown to the winds as soon as the coveted office is obtained. In the initial struggle for power, always consistent with the birth of a new political regime, the principle efforts of those temporarily in office are directed invariably toward consolidation of political gains, and toward crushing the forces of opposition. Offices, such as parliamentary secretariships, are created to strengthen party position,- it may even happen that more than half of the Assembly Members may at sometime hold one government position or another in the plot to keep a political party in power. Even those Ministers who have a genuine desire to fulfil the duties of their offices have first to consider their own precarious position in the party set up; they cannot afford to offend the electorate, and must devote a large part of their time and efforts to favour-seeking constituent voters who, with the electorate, are not concerned with the public duties of their Ministers, but seek only to use their influence for their personal gain. 

The main purpose of any good constitution is to make it possible for the finest type of people to be drafted into the service of their country; it is the duty of these people to provide their countrymen with an efficient and progressive government. As opposed to this, we are all too familiar with the British colonial system of governing which gave prominence to administrators pledged to carry out a policy dedicated to the interests of the foreign ruler. Consequently, those men trained under British administrators are hardly likely to be chosen by the people’s wish to represent their needs and desires in the new government. Where then are we to turn for the well-qualified and experienced electorate needed for the operation of a successful democracy? Until the mass of the people become better educated, from what body of men are we to draw our administrators? It is my opinion that we should face our deficienc[unclear] honestly, recognize our temporary lack of qualified leadership among the people, and frame our constitution in such a way as to utilize the services of those of our countrymen who are leaders by birth and training, and at the same time protect the people against self-interested, power-grabbing political upstarts. 

Amongst the hereditary rulers of Indian States, the aristocracy and men of exceptional education and experience, certain qualifications are to be found which could be utilized to advantage in the new government Nowhere else in India can be found training in states manship, diplomacy and administration to compare wit[unclear] the life long education in governing obtained by thes[unclear] classes by virtue of their position. Many are th[unclear]  criticisms which have in the past been directed at th[unclear] policies of the princes and at the work of the aristocracy most of them rightly earned. But these abuses are thos[unclear] which inevitably accompany an excess of power exercise[unclear] with the connivance of a foreign government. No government of any form whatever can be without errors an[unclear] abuses if too much power is delegated to one man however intelligent and capable he may be In the new[unclear] government, the abuse of power by anyone in offic[unclear] must be legislated against. so that the public is protecte[unclear] by its constitution from immorality in high places. Th[unclear] principle qualifications of the new heads of our government, then, should be those of ability, training, intelligence, education, leadership, statesmanship, and popula[unclear] appeal. Where else in our country can we find men s[unclear] well qualified to be the titular heads of our governmen[unclear] than amongst our hereditary ruling families? It is m contention that, as the Rajpramukh Rulers should remai at the head of their own groups of states, so should th[unclear] provinces of the Indian Union elect their own Governor through an electoral college set up for this purpose. A[unclear] for the nominal head of the Indian Union, it is my belie that we could not do better than to select a man o princely background and training and personal appeal; n[unclear] ordinary man could hope to unite the masses of India today, no matter how capable or how disinterested his service to his country might be, with the psychological bonds of loyalty and devotion which are the strongest in time of national crisis. Our people are not sufficiently advanced in democratic thinking to give to any other kind of ruler the honour and respect, the blind loyalty and loving-fear that they would be ready to pledge to a popular prince of their own choosing. Among the Raj-pramukhs of India there should be one who could be selected through an electoral college who, with the assistance of an elected advisor, would be an outstanding choice for this dignified role amongst the world’s rulers. 

Under the present circumstances, then, the best constitution for India today would, I believe, incorporate the principles of democratic, representative government into a kind of benevolent, monarchical rule, traditional in India and understandable to the mass of its people. For half a century or more India should move forward toward her goal of government of the people along comfortably familiar lines, always encouraging, of course, the free development of the germ of evolution present in her body, so that, as conditions change, as the people become more educated and better trained to govern themselves, the necessary amendments could be made to her constitution to allow for a steady progress towards a true Indian democracy. 

Let us now consider a workable constitutional government plan to be operated under the leadership of the Ruler of the State or the Governor of the province, as the case may be. My first suggestion reaches back through the centuries to revive a fine tradition of the East,- that is, the ancient and honoured Council of Elders. This would consist of three persons who have retired from administration or public life, and whose experience and knowledge would benefit the head of the State or Province. The Council would act merely as an advisary board, and have no legislative powers. One of the Council of Elders would be nominated by the Ruler or Governor, one by the Governor General of the Indian Union, and one by the Assembly. They would receive a retaining allowance for the period of their service in the Council, which would be of five years’ duration. 

The Provincial Governor, or the Rajpramukh Ruler of a State, would perform more administrative duties than are incumbant on a mere constitutional head. His initial function, in consultation with the Council of Elders, would be the appointment of his Chief Minister for a period of five years, which would be the normal term of each Assembly. The Chief Minister should be a man of outstanding ability and experience with special qualifications for this important position; he need not be selected from the body of elected Members of the Assembly. Again, in consultation with the Chief Minister and the Council, the Ruler or Governor would nominate his Ministry; these men should be chosen for ability and experience rather than elected status and need not derive from the Assembly Members. The Chief Minister and the other Ministers would be eligible for reappointment at the expiry of their five-year terms. If any elected Member is appointed to the office of Minister, he would be required to resign his seat in the Assembly. This would ensure to the Governor or Rajpramukh a Ministry upon which he could depend for cooperation and in which he could feel confidence; it would also make him, and the Chief Minister, responsible to the Assembly for the conduct of the other Ministerial Offices. The Majority Party of the elected members would naturally control the government policies, but the Ministry would sit in the Legislature as nominated, non-voting Members, and would be answerable to the Assembly for the conduct of their offices; they would have a right to advise in the framing of policies and the passing of legislation, but they would be required to follow the policy finally decided upon by the Assembly. 

The Assembly would consist of elected representatives of the people, whose duty it would be to see that the government operated in their interests. The question of the advisability of adult franchise enters here; this highly advanced democratic prerogative, however fine in principle, would appear to be far too advanced a privilege for the illiterate masses which form the majority in India today. Most of our people are unable to assess the advantages of one political party over another, but are usually victims of powerful propaganda, or of vote-buying of one sort or the other. Our aim should be to obtain a fair representation of the people, perhaps through allowing the franchise to those with a certain minimum standard of literacy, until the mass of India’s people have been educated to the level of Adult Franchise. Until such a time, a general election would have a demoralizing effect, degenerating into nothing more dignified than a wholesale vote-catching whose effect would certainly be to undermine the people’s confidence in, and respect for, their government. Ideally, the franchise should be limited to those persons who would be able to appreciate the relative advantages of different political systems for their country as well as to evaluate the comparative qualifications of candidates standing for election; the voting of these people would confirm the State’s stability. However, I believe that some system of adult franchise is inevitable, and that the best way of offsetting its disadvantages would be the institution of indirect elections. Under this system, a group of villages having, perhaps, abou t 10,000 voters, would be required to elect a Primary Member; it is reasonably safe to assume that such a group is likely to elect a good man, and one who would truly represent their interests, as he would be well known to all or most of them. These Primary Members would then elect the members of the State or Provincial Assemblies. The Primary Members would be elected under a system of joint electorate, but it might be advisable to allot some seats on a proportionate basis as a temporary measure to ensure fair represntation of minorites.  

Although the Ministry would, under the proposed system, be responsible for the administration of the government, the Assembly would hold a powerful check on it s actions. In the event of the Assembly considering the Chief Minister and his Government to be following a policy contrary to the one decided upon by the Assembly, or having committed a fundamental breach of the principles of that policy, or being generally inefficient or corrupt or otherwise undesirable, a vote of non-confidenc[unclear] against the Chief Minister or his administration would be proposed in the Assembly. As soon as notice is given of such a motion, and a statement of the reasons for the non-confidence vote submitted to him, the Rajpramukh or Governor would ask the Council of Elders to make an inquiry into the non-confidence motion. The report subsequently submitted by the Council would be placed before the Assembly together with an explanatory statement from the Chief Minister. If, after consideration of the Council’s report and the Chief Minister’s explanation, the vote of non-confidence is pressed by the Assembly and passed, the Ruler or Governor would be required to replace his Chief Minister, appointing his successor, who need not be a member of the Assembly. The Governor or Ruler would, in turn, appoint his Ministery, in consultatio[unclear] with the new Chief Minister; any of these men except those against whom the vote of non-confidence is passed may be reappointed from the old Ministery. The Assembly would have the right to continue to pass a vote of nonconfidence against any Ministry which is unsatisfactory in its estimation.  

The system of government I have suggested here is based on the conception that it is the duty of the Governor or Ruler to provide a good Government for his people, and it is the business of the elected representatives of the people to see that the Government is operated in their interests and for their welfare. The great advantage of this system would be that the Government would be administered by capable, trained officers, who would have the confidence of their Chief and the desire to co–operate with him. The Assembly, which would constitute the people’s voice, would merely lay down the general policies which it wished the government to follow, and see that these policies were carried out to their satisfaction. Such a government would be stable, efficient, and honest, and would contain far fewer frictional elements than a system wherein all of the offices were filled by elected men from the mass of the people who are likely to possess varying degrees of education, experience and ability, and who are bound to have sectional loyalties. 

The internal stability of the States and Provinces, at this critical time in India’s history, would be a stabilizing factor to the whole of the Indian nation; an unstable government, either local or central, would react most unfavourably on the country in the event of internal or external national emergency. The honesty of such a government would be unimpeachable since the administration would be responsible to the legislature who would direct its policies and retain the power to replace it if it is found to be unsatisfactory. At the same time, the elected offices would attract only public spirited men who would stand for election with the welfare of their country at heart. As Members of the Assembly, they could assure good government for their Province or State, with the confidence of their constituency that they are not out to grab power or capture ministeries, but are serving with true selflessness,–they would have no reason to fight the administration or to change the government except for the good of the people they represent. Furthermore, a wholesome advantage of this system would be that the services would be kept immune from party political influence. The integrity of the services would be ensured, enabling them to discharge their responsibilities without fear or favour. 

I have outlined in brief a simple, workable, and equitable plan for a State or Provincial government, containing these principle features; Ruler or Governor selected as far as possible from old and respected, possibly royal, lineage for his popularity and leadership qualities, his education in diplomacy and statesmanship, as well as for his ability and experience; a Council of Elders nominated to assist and advise the Ruler or Governor; Chief Minister and Ministry to be selected by the Ruler or Governor for their ability, suitability for their offices, loyalty and co-operation; Assembly to be elected by Primary Members representing the people, to be the only voting members of the legislature, to have the power to frame the policies to be followed by the Government, and the right to demand a change in the government by a vote of non-confidence. 

The administration of the Central Government would be based on similar principles. The Governor General would be selected by an electoral college established for this purpose and consisting of Members of the Central, Provincial and State Assemblies; these Assemblies would also send elected Members to serve in the Central Assembly. The Central Assembly would elect an Adviser to the Governor General who, with the Governor General, would set up the Central Government by appointing the Prime Minister and, with his help, selecting the Ministry in the same way as would be the case in the State and Provincial Ministries. The Ministers would have no vote, and the Assembly would be allowed t he privilege of demanding a change of government as in the States or Provinces. 

All over an uneasy world today eyes are turned to the East, which is now in its ascendency after centuries of the domination of Western civilizations. India with a strong, stable government could be ready to take her rightful place among the Leader Nations; India weakened, disunited, unfit for self-rule in the eyes of a watching world, would lose not only the support and respect of her own people, but would forfeit her chance for a first place amongst the nations of the world. It is with this fateful choice in view that I submit, with all humility, a plan for a strong, united Indian government; let it be a challenge to stimulate serious thinking and give direction and purpose toward the framing of the best possible constitution for Free India. 

1.Certain content in the document was unclear or incompletely written. The same has been marked as [unclear].  

2.Typographical errors in the original document have been retained to ensure authentic reproduction of the original document