They left it to be provided by auxiliary legislation. So they considered the decision of this House of the 29th July and the original article 289 is in conformity with that. And the House will consider whether clauses (1) and (2) of article 289 are not enough for the purpose. Granting that election are the basis of democracy and should be free from executive interference, let us see whether article 289 (1) and (2) are or are not enough. So far as federal elections are concerned the provisions of the present amended or substituted article and clause (1) of article 289 are the same. Supposing we have to provide for the appointment of a federal Commission, it cannot be done by the Central Government which is an Executive Authority. It has to be done by the President. Then with regard to clause (2) the Drafting Committee thought that with respect to appointment of a Commission for the province it will be equally independent if that appointment was made not by the Government of the day but by the Governor of the State. At the time of the Draft the idea was that there should be an elected Governor. Now at present we have no elected Governor but now we have provided for a Governor who will be nominated by the President. So virtually the appointment of the Commission to be made by the nominated Governor will be in the hands of the President himself. The Commission appointed by the President for the purpose of elections to the federal legislature can be independent. But I do not see why in the provinces the Commission appointed by the Governor should not be equally independent. His official existence depends entirely on the President. In that respect, if it was thought necessary, the power could be given to the President himself to make the appointment of a Provincial Commissioner. But is it necessary that we should go back and have one Central Commission only with all the inconveniences that it is likely to cause? Then clause (3) removes the regional Commission altogether. There is only one Central Commission and the regional commissioners are to assist that election commission. Is it desirable that one Commission sitting in one corner of India should be entrusted to do this work, and the regional commissioners are merely to assist? I see absolutely no reason why this should be done. Then I find that after the Constitution was presented to us, a note was given to us toward the middle of May 1949 which indicates to us the reasons for changing what we decided on 29th July 1947. Let us analyse the reasons given. The first reason is that this is a matter which requires careful consideration and that it has been hinted in a section of the press that in some provinces the Governments are helping the registration of their own supporters. This is a point which was adverted to by Dr. Ambedkar also. Sir, there will be no one in this House who will not condemn such practices aimed at the denying the people the franchise which this Constitution gives them. But then what is the remedy for it? The Proper remedy would be to take action against people who resort to such practices. The Central Government has full power and authority to see that nothing of the kind is done. This is in the interests of democracy. Then we are told that it is hinted in a certain section of the press that certain provincial Governments are taking certain irregular actions. Sir, if it is merely a hint why should we be upset? Perhaps Dr. Ambedkar knows better how things are happening in the provinces. He may have information in the Cabinet. If this is so, it is better to take action against people who trifle with democracy on linguistic, racial or other consideration.
