Sir, I would like to tell the House that when we borrow from the example of Dominions like Canada and Australia, we forget that what obtains in those countries today is something totally different from what they were in the beginning. For instance, in Australia the appointment of the Governors until the passing of the Statute of Westminster was done in the same way as it is done in any colony. The position of the Governor in an Australian province was that he was directly responsible to the Minister in charge of Commonwealth Relations of whatever it was called at that time in London. He had direct access to Whitehall: he could correspond direct and he often got instructions direct from the British Ministry concerned because it was only after the passing direct from the British Ministry concerned because it was only after the passing of the Statute of Westminster that Australia was recognize an undivided unit and the system of British-Minister directly corresponding with the Governors of the various province, was allowed to pass into desuetude. In regard to Canada where the constitutional position as it was some time back bore some analogy to conditions in this country, there is one particular principle that is in operation on which I would like to lay some emphasis which will have no application to this country at all. It is avowed by every writer on the Canadian constitution that the whole scheme of the appointment of Lieutenant Governors and the control that the Dominion exercise over the provinces is such that the ultimate control is in the hands of the Dominion Government. Actually under the Canadian Constitution the Cabinet of the Dominion issues instructions to the Lieutenant Governors; in fact they have exercised their discretion in removing the Governor. Two instances are know in which the Governors have been removed. The Lieutenant Governor in a Canadian Constitution acts as an agent of the Dominion Governor in a Canadian Constitution acts as an agent of the Dominion Government. I would at once disclaim all ideas, at any rate so far as I am concerned, that we in this House want the future Governor who is to be nominated by the President to be in any sense an agent of the Central Government. I would like the point to be made very clear, because such an idea finds no place in the scheme of Government we envisage for the future. While considering the scheme of the distribution of powers which will ultimately be settled by this House, if it is found necessary that the Centre must have some powers reserved for itself in order to ensure good Government in the provinces, in order to enable it to interfere when the need for such interference arises we can adequately provide for that contingency in the distribution of powers. There is no need for us to adopt an outworn system, a system which has grown, because of historic traditions, because of that figment of imagination which was actually translated into practice by British ministers, namely, the preservation of the prerogative of the Crown in the Dominions. We have no need to use that particular system not to impose the will of the Centre, if it is necessary and if circumstances make it necessary, on the provinces by means of making the Governor the agent for the purpose. Sir, I think much of the objection that has been raised to this idea of nomination would fall to the ground if this point is understood. We do not want either by this particular article or by any other article that will be passed by this House in future to make the Governor of a Province an agent of the Centre at all. The utility of a nominated Governor has been very fully dealt with by the Honourable the Prime Minister and I would like to tell Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla this: Notwithstanding his conviction, notwithstanding the fact of these years of struggle against British Imperialism which people have carried in various ways and which Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla has carried on within the cabinets functioning under the British Governors, we are fully convinced that we do not want to give up the system of election where it is necessary; at the same time we do not want to duplicate the system of elections.
