I can conceive of a contingency in which this position may be abused; i.e. when controversial legislation may have been hurried through almost in the last days when the House of the People is likely to be dissolved, and the Upper House also being in sympathy with it might pass through all stages such Bills before the new Lower House can take up the matter. Difficulties of this nature might arise, especially if the newly elected House is dominated by a different party from that which preceded it. In that contingency, however there is no need to fear that the will of the people will not prevail, because either the Council of States may not pass the legislation passed by the previous House of the People, or if passed by it, it may not be assented to by the President. There is also nothing to prevent the new Lower House from enacting any other Bill contravening or rejecting the measure passed by its predecessor at the last moment. I think that by this amendment time would be saved, simplification of procedure would be assured, and duplication of work avoided.
