The poisonous effect of joint executive and judiciary functions is notorious. Cases have happened where the Government or the Prime Minister telegraphed to the District Magistrate that a particular case should be decided or dealt with in a particular manner. These matters have come to the notice of the High Court. One such case arose in Calcutta only a few years ago and there were severe strictures made about it. This is also happening today. It is a revealing thing that in these days of independence such things are possible. In fact, the magistracy is controlled indirectly by wire-pulling from the top. I submit that the arguments of one very distinguished Member of the House and a distinguished lawyer, Mr. Munshi, require adequate consideration. Mr. Munshi seems to suggest that the separation and independence of the judiciary is not practicable at this stage and the argument he has advanced is somewhat unexpected, if I may respectfully say so. He pointed out that we have taken rule-making powers. There are the Industrial Courts and other things where Government has to take decisions. I would however submit that rule-making power has nothing to do with the separation of the judiciary and executive. Take as much power as you like. A democratic House will give you power that is needed. You can pass any laws you like. All that the independence of the judiciary means is that within the rules you make, the power that you give to the Courts, should be allowed to be exercised without Executive interference-that when a magistrate exercises judicial functions he should be above any influence. The worse thing that he can do is to refuse real justice to the people. If there is one thing which will thrill the hearts of people and will make our independence a solid achievement it is the confidence in the Judiciary. The moment you let any person think that he will not have confidence in the Judiciary, the stability of the Government will be undermined. I submit that from this point of view the independence of the Judiciary should be guaranteed. It is not as if this is being asked for too soon. This is a reform for which we have been asking for a long time. What is the argument today against this reform? It is the argument which the British Government had been advancing for over fifty years. We are repeating their argument today. I submit that the principle should be accepted here and now without any qualification and without any mental reservation. I submit that the rule-making power and the need for interference by the State in many matters will not really go to the root of the matter. The judiciary may yet remain independent of them. The executive should have the power to make rules. But within the narrow limits of powers given to Court, let them be exercised independently. Sir, a distinguished Member of the House with rich judicial experience has pointed out that this agitation is as old as the time of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, more than a hundred years ago. In fact this has been the strongest plank in the platform of our nationalist agitation. I mean to say that if the judiciary is not separated from the influence of the Executive there will be intellectual corruption. There will be undermining of the faith of the people in the judiciary.
