There is one other matter which I might mention, although it has not been provided for in my amendment, nor has it been referred to by Members who have taken part in this debate. No doubt, by clause (3) of my new article 122 we have made provision that the administration charges of the Supreme Court shall be a charge on the revenues of India, but the question is whether this provision contained in clause (3) is enough for the purpose of securing the independence of the judiciary. Now, ‘speaking for myself, I do not think that this clause by itself would be sufficient to secure the independence of the Judiciary. After all, what does it mean when we say that a particular charge shall be a charge on the consolidated funds of the State? All that it means is this, that it need not be put to the vote of the House. Beyond that it has no meaning. We have ourselves said that when any particular charge is declared to be a charge on the revenues of India, all that will happen is that it will become a sort of non-votable thing although it will be open to discussion by the Legislature. Therefore, reading clause (3) of article 122, in the light of the provisions that we have made, all that it means is this, that part of the budget relating to the Judiciary will not be required to be voted by the Legislature annually. But I think there is a question which goes to the root of the matter and must take precedence and that is who is to determine what are the requirements of the Supreme Court. We have made no such provision at all. We have left it to the executive to determine how much money may be allotted year after year to the judiciary. It seems to me that that is a very vulnerable position and requires to be rectified. At this stage I only wish to draw the attention of the House to the provisions contained in section 216 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which says that the Governor-General shall exercise his individual judgment as to the amount to be included in respect of the administrative expenses of the Federal Court in any estimates of expenditure laid by him before the Chambers of the Federal legislature. So that if the executive differed from the Chief Justice as to the amount of money that was necessary for running properly the Federal Court, the Governor-General may intervene and decide how much money should be allotted. That provision now of course is incompatible with the pattern of the constitution we are adopting and we must therefore, in my judgment, find some other method of securing for the Chief Justice an adequacy of funds to carry on his administration. I do not wish for the moment to delay the article on that account. I only mention it to the House, so that if it considers desirable some suitable amendment may be brought in at a later stage to cover the point.
