A joint sitting is provided for in Australia. So far as the Centre is concerned, it is a different affair. We have provided for a joint sitting, in the case of the Centre, to resolve the difficulties arising out of difference of opinion between the Lower House and the Upper House, on the lines of the Australian Constitution. So far as the provinces are concerned, we have not got the Constitution of those States. Thinking independently of any of these Constitutions, I agree with this Amendment that we ought not to impose an obligation to create a new right in the Council, which is an unwanted council. Almost every province is against having a separate council. In these circumstances, let us not impose a Council with enormous powers, a Council sitting on the fence and deciding one way or the other, making the considered opinion of the Lower House a nullity. Honourable Members will also consider another aspect. The Lower House to which the Ministry is responsible, is fully in charge of Money Bills; so far as Money Bills are concerned, the Upper House is not concerned except for discussing here and there. With respect to other Bills; it may be a matter of substance, and it may mean a vote of no-confidence so far as the Ministry is concerned, and the Ministry may have to go out of office. It will create a number of complications. In these circumstances, the only proper method is to see that, after a period of one or two sessions, if the Lower House persists in having its Bill pushed through and the Upper House does not consent, the Bill as passed by the Lower House automatically becomes law. That would avoid all conflicts with the Lower House and also encourage all States to have an Upper House and take their advice.
