Take, again, another instance in which in my opinion the working democracy of this country has yet to be realised, and certainly not in this Constitution. I mean the question of the formation and functions of the various organs of the State. Again and again I had tried to put in amendments suggesting, if not a complete separation of the powers and functions and organisation between the principle organs of the State. There must be at least such a measure of mutual independence, at least such a degree of mutual freedom as would ensure the operation of each within its own sphere to the fullness that such power is given to that body under the Constitution without interference from outside or other organs of the State. I am afraid that, if we scrutinise the chapter relating to the legislatures, to the judiciary and to the executive, we cannot but come to the conclusion that the freedom or independence of these institutions, the real sovereignty of these institutions, is hardly likely to operate in actual practice. Constitutional pandits are not wanting in this House who declare that the doctrine of the division of powers stands exploded. I am afraid I am not one of those who can share that opinion. Even those who have found it necessary to keep and maintain close links and mutual influences between the various organs of the State, even they could have wished to introduce those safeguards, those provisions which might have enabled each of these bodies to function with a degree of independence, with a degree of sureness about their own work. But those safeguards have not been provided. I am not going, Sir, to go over in great detail–there is not the time for it–each of the provisions that would in my judgment imply this aspect of the Constitution.
