Now these are the various functions that are going to be entrusted to this Election Commission. Superintendence, direction and control of what things, firstly, of the preparation of the electoral rolls for all elections to Parliament to State Legislatures and for all elections to the offices of President and the Vice-President. The electoral rolls for these elections are to be under the supervision, direction and control of this Election Commission. Secondly, its function is the conduct of all these elections. These are the two functions that are going to be entrusted to the Election Commission. Now let us see how the election of the President is going to be, how the election of the Vice-President is going to be, how the election of members of the Council of States is going to be and lastly how the election of members to the Legislative Councils of the States is going to be. Under article 43 which we have already passed the President will be elected by the elected members of both Houses of Parliament and by the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the various States. Now the question is what will be the electoral roll of all these members? Is it the intention of Dr. Ambedkar that the question as to who are to be the electors who will form these electoral colleges is to be decided by this Commission? Now the electors will be members who will have been already duly elected to the House of the People, Council of States and the various Legislative Assemblies. They will be already duly elected members. So the question of preparing an electoral roll of these members simply does not arise at all. It should not be open-I think it will be readily admitted-to the Election Commission to decide as to which of those particular members are unqualified. A person once having been duly elected can of course become disqualified from remaining as a member; and so far as the Legislative Assembly of the various States are concerned, we have only the other day enacted article 167-A which lays down that if any such question arises, it will be decided by the Governor and the order or decision of the Governor shall be final. Now that decision and order or the Governor being final what function remains for the Election Commission to perform in the matter of determining the question as to which particular members are entitled or not entitled to participate in the election of the President? So far as the preparation of electoral roll is concerned, the Election Commission has not function to perform. The second is the stage of conducting the election itself. Now the question arises that the members of the House of the People will be called upon to elect by President and also members of the Council of States, and so also elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the various States. These person will cast their votes as members of the various Legislatures and as such they must perform that function of casting their votes under the supervision, direction and control of the presiding officers of the respective legislatures. Is it the intention to divest the presiding officers of these various legislatures of their ordinary and inherent right of conducting these elections? I suppose not. So that so far as the election of the President is concerned, both in the matter of the preparation of the electoral roll as also in the matter of the conduct of election, the Election Commission shall have absolutely no function to perform or it has, obviously it will come in conflict with the presiding officers of these various legislative bodies. Now let us come to the question of the election of the Vice-President. There the matter is more complicated still. The election of a Vice-President it was pointed out to us-the credit of which must go to my honourable Friend Mr. Tyagi-it was pointed out by him outside the House that under article 55 we have it “That the Vice-President shall be elected by members of both House of Parliament assembled at a joint meeting in accordance with the system etc.” Here also we find that the question as to who shall vote for the election of Vice-President is already definitely determined by article 55, and the Election Commission will have nothing to do about this. The manner of conducting the election is also laid down in article 55. All the members will sit together in a joint meeting which will be presided over, as has been provided, by the Speaker of the House of the People. Where does the Election Commission come in as regards the election of Vice-President? Thirdly comes the question of election of members of the Council of States. Under article 67 they are to be elected by the elected members of the legislative assemblies of the various States. There too the members who will participate in the election are well-known; there is no question of preparation of electoral roll there. Then as to the conduct of elections and casting of votes, that will be done, as in the past, under the direction and control of the Speakers of the various legislatures; and interference by the Election Commission will lead to conflict with the Speakers. The same objection will apply in the case of elections of these members to the legislative Councils of the States who are to be elected by the members of the legislative assemblies in the various States. Therefore, while the underlying intention of article 289 is a laudable one and while we must provide for elections to be conducted under the supervision and control of a central authority appointed by the Central Government, we must so frame the article as to obviate any chances of conflict between the Election Commissions and the presiding officers of the various States, by taking away those things which may give rise to such conflicts. We should also take note of article 55 in which we have provided for the election of Vice-President. Therefore I submit that it is necessary to recast this article so as to make it applicable to direct elections only to House of People and legislative assemblies. Today we can commit ourselves definitely to the principle that all elections shall be conducted under the supervision, direction and control of a central authority, subject of course to such variations as appear obviously necessary in the light of article 55 and in the light of what I have already submitted. That is what I have to submit and the amendment of which I had given notice was only in regard to these points that I have raised. If the difficulties and apprehensions that I have raised are in any way removable by some interpretation of article 289 that Dr. Ambedkar may give, that is another thing.
