A similar provision, I submit, is not only necessary from the point of view of constitutional principle but also of expediency. Sir, the position is this. My Honourable friend Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar, has referred to the Income-tax laws. But there may be other federal laws-laws relating to extradition, to naturalisation, to defence and external affairs, to treason against the Federal Government-which are matters of the most vital importance to the existence of the Centre; and therefore the power of pardon cannot be given. I submit, to anybody except the head of the Federal Government. If the right is given to either the Ruler of a State or a Provincial Governor, the consequences will be, in a contingency, disastrous. Take for instance this. In principle the Governor or the Ruler-because they will be in the same position-will be entrusted with a part of the prerogative, which must vest in he head of he Union as a whole and any part of it. This, I submit, is inconsistent with principle. But apart from that there will be an inequality of treatment. Supposing in province ‘A’ the responsible ministry takes a particular view and advises the Governor to release a particular person; there is no appeal from it but then in another province a different view is taken. Therefore, for the same offence you will find one provincial Governor giving pardon and in the other the Governor not giving a pardon. And let us not assume that the Rulers of States are going to be for ever and ever absolute little sovereigns that they think they are now. Many States have introduced an element of responsibility; I have no doubt in my mind that the general progress of the country will soon compel every State to have- some element of responsibility in its Government. Arid when that comes, it it not the Ruler who will exercise the right of reprieve and pardon but the Ministry of the State who will advise the Ruler, which will give a pardon. In a conceivable instance, therefore, it may be that it will not suit a Province or a State to allow a particular kind of criminal to remain in jail. Take a case of war; it has happened in Ireland and England but I do not want to go into cases. It has happened very often in War that different views have been taken in regard to certain offences against the State. What would happen if, against the desire and against the policy of the Centre, the heads of the units or the unit ministries take upon themselves to grant, reprieve or pardon? If the policies of the State and the Centre are of different character and the former want to grant a reprieve for a set of offences-and reprieve, as you know, means postponement of a sentence and if this power is not with the President but vested in the Governor or a Ruler, serious complications will arise. Therefore, I submit that a crime against the Federal Government is, really speaking,, based upon the loyalty of each citizen to the Federal Government as a citizen of the Union as a whole. Therefore, pursuing that principle, the power of reprieve and pardon must vest in the President of the Federal Government and it cannot be parted with.
