Mr. President, Sir, I support the original clause moved by the Honourable President of the Committee that the Governor’s Ministers shall be chosen and summoned by him and shall hold office during his pleasure. While doing so, I have very few remarks to make. Clause 14 lays down that in the appointment of his Ministers and his relations with them, the Governor shall be generally guided by the convention of responsible Government as set out in Schedule so and so. In the latter part of this Clause 14, it is said that the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that it was done otherwise than in accordance with these conventions. Now, Sir, especially for minorities instead of keeping power in the hands of the Governor to choose his Ministers it would have been better if it had been kept in the hands of the Legislature. For instance the Governor or the Premier may select Ministers of his own choice, men who will implicitly obey the Premier, or the Governor. But such people will not command the confidence of the particular section of the people whom they are expected to represent. Therefore if it had been something like the Swiss model, leaving the Executive to be formed by the Legislature, then every group and every member of the Legislature will have a chance to select their own representatives. Such representatives will be true and effective representatives. But there comes the trouble. If the Cabinet is formed in this manner, then in the Cabinet there will, be divergent elements, one pulling on one side and another pulling on a different side and so there will not be homogeneity in the Cabinet. I do see the point. In order to avoid that situation the Cabinet must be made to select its Premier, because then the Ministers of the Cabinet cannot but follow the Premier.
