Mr. President Sir, when some of us wanted to participate In this discussion yesterday I had an impression that the Report that has been so ably and impressively moved by Sri Gopalaswamy Ayyangar would receive the general benediction of this House. Of course, we were prepared for the amendment which Maulana Hasrat Mohani moved in a bilingual speech, but the speech of Mr. Santhanam, for whose objective attitude I have very high regard, took my breath away. Mr. President, we seem to discuss this question of division of powers as though it were a kind of tug of war or a tussle between me authority and another. It is nothing of the kind. It is a plan whereby through mutual concessions, provincial and cultural loyalties should be preserved and promote the political strength and solidarity of the Indian Union. The second Report itself has explained lucidly why residual powers should be with the Centre.Maulana Hasrat Mohani yesterday astonished us by saying that now that there is partition of India there is no reason for these residual powers to be with the Centre. On the contrary, the reason why this concession of residual powers was to be given to the Units was a kind of bargaining for communal considerations. But now that there is partition, there is no reason why the homogeneous Indian State should clot have a strong Centre. There is some fascination,Mr. President, for always referring to the Union of Socialist Republics, but if you study the constitution and development of Soviet Russia, what do you find. The right of secession and other rights which are given to the Units are theoretical rights. The whole State is maintained through the rigid and ruthless discipline of the Communist Party. And therefore there is no point in always referring to the Union of Socialist Republics in India as though the socialist republics could be independent. As was pointed out by the previous speaker, Shri Balkrishna Sharma, even if you have socialism in this country, it is absolutely essential that there should be a Central direction and initiative. We should not forget, Mr. President, that the Federation that we are trying to evolve is a Federation which has no precedent in the world, because till now through the British administrative machinery and through their treaties and agreements with the Indian States, we have had a powerful Centre in this country. In several other countries, where Federation has been built up, it has been built up through independent sovereign States coming together whereas here until 1935 the whole question was one of decentralisation and revolution. And secondly, the whole relationship between the Centre, which was under British Indian administration until the 15th August, and the Indian States is one which is unique. It is no use people getting impatient and saying that there should be complete uniformity between the Provinces and the States from the beginning. We are not writing on a clean slate, and even if the system is illogical we have to remember that logic does not always fit in with politics. We have seen, for instance, that the British, who are admittedly a most illogical people, have made a remarkable success of their constitution. We have therefore to build up the national unity of India in the best possible manner. This question of relationship between the Centre and the Provinces is considered as though it is one of mere political mechanism and separation of powers, but what will ultimately determine these relationships are economic facts and financial considerations. May I say, with all respect, that we are too apt to derive our ideas and frame the constitutional pattern on the 19th century political ideology of Britain? There is some danger in our thinking of the Federal system or some particular forms of government in the abstract as having some special merits which make them desirable in themselves. We are always fond of quoting some models, some patterns, and arguing that as A, B and C powers do not exist in some constitution of the world, we cannot have them in our own country. This sort of imitation of political institutions, of transplantation of political institutions from other countries has always some risks. There is said to be a tribe of monkeys in Africa which copy faithfully the houses of men and then live on the outside of them instead of inside. The transplantation of political institutions is not free from this danger of copying the obvious and leaving out the essential. We have to build up this system on the conditions of our own country, not on any abstract theories. The local needs and interests in our own country require special treatment and nobody suggests that this vast country with its size and its multiple people can be ruled on a unitary basis. “Over-centralisation”, a French political observer said, “leads to anaemia at the extremities and apoplexy at the Centre”. Undue centralisation is not a way of achieving uniformity. In fact, we do not wish to effect uniformity in this country, but unity in essential matters. But I must emphasise that we have to be on guard against fissiparous and disintegrating tendencies which are always bound to prevail and we have to be conscious of our national unity which we have achieved and which we must maintain as one of our priceless possessions. Mr. President, it is very often argued by our British friends that one of the greatest gifts of the British Government to this country has been the administrative unity which has been given to it. There is no doubt some truth in it, but there is also truth in this that as the national movement grew stronger, the British Government encouraged in this country every kind of fissiparous and disintegrating tendency and the result is the partition we see before our eyes. We are unfortunately too prone to fall victims to these disintegrating and centrifugal tendencies. Paradoxical though it may seem, it is only a strong Centre which can build up adequate provincial autonomy and achieve decentralisation. Under the scheme which has been presented to you, it can be broadly stated that the power to regulate economic life is divided between the Provinces and the Centre and there is wide scope for provincial powers and responsibilities in the economic and social spheres. After all, we have to judge this problem from the angle of the needs of the ordinary citizens and see how best they could be satisfied and not lose ourselves in the politics of machinery and manoeuvre.
