Sir, there are other examples of this kind that I could give; but I do not think that I need do so in order to illustrate what I have in mind. Now, I will give an illustration or two to show where matters which can hardly be called justiciable have been included in the Report. Clause 8 deals with certain familiar fundamental rights; the freedom of speech, the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and the right to form associations. But they have all been made subject to certain safeguards, which, generally speaking, have been considered necessary in every country. But it is well known, Sir, that these safeguards practically make the rights that I have just mentioned non-justiciable. You may confer general rights on the citizens of India, but if they are to be surrounded with the restrictions mentioned here, and I submit that they will have to be surrounded with some such restrictions–then the right will in practice cease to be justiciable. They will be no more than directive principles of a policy, and there seems to me to be no advantage in considering such matters at this stage when, according to Mr. Patel, we should be considering only those rights that are, strictly speaking, enforceable by the courts.
