One of the points on which they found themselves at loggerheads was the question of provincial autonomy. Of course, it was realised that there could not be complete provincial autonomy in a Constitution which intended to preserve the unity of India, both in the matter of legislation and administration. But the Muslim League took up such an adamant attitude on this point that the Secretary of State had to make certain concessions in order to reconcile the Muslim League to the acceptance of some sort of responsible Government at the Centre. One of the things which the then Secretary of State did was to introduce this clause which is contained in Section 126 of the Government of India Act which stated that the authority of the Central Government so far as legislation in the concurrent field was concerned was to be strictly limited to the issue of directions and it should not extend to the actual administration of the matter itself. The argument was that there would have been no objection on the part of the Muslim League to have the Centre administer a particular law in the concurrent field if the Central Government was not likely to be dominated by the Hindus. That was so expressly stated, I remember, during the debates in the Round Table Conference. It is because the Muslim League Governments which came into existence in the provinces where the Muslims formed a majority such as for instance in the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal and to some extent Assam, did not want it in the field which they thought exclusively belonged to them by reason of their majority, that the Secretary of State had to make this concession. I have no doubt about it that this was a concession. It was not an acceptance of the principle that the Centre should have no authority to administer a law passed in the concurrent filed. My submission therefore is that the position stated in Section 126 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is not to be justified on principle; it is justified because it was a concession made to the Muslims. Therefore, it is not proper to rely upon Section 126 in drawing any support for the arguments which have been urged in favour of this amendment.
