Now, the original clause of this Bill made a very wide provision. It intended to give power to the Centre to appoint its own agency for the execution of any or all of the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent List. That is hardly possible ands altogether improbable, because it is not conceivable that the Centre could administer all the subjects that are included in the Concurrent List, in all the Provinces of India. That is beyond the capacity of even the most resourceful and powerful Centre. It would have led to a great deal of confusion, if we had two parallel agencies and machineries in the provinces to deal with matters that came within the purview of the Concurrent List. The Concurrent List includes criminal law, it includes civil law, it includes arbitration. It includes also miscellaneous subjects such as boilers, engines and so on and so forth. Now, if we had parallel agencies appointed on the one hand by the Provinces and on the other by the Centre, for the execution laws relating to these matters, then there would be confusion and chaos and no government would be able to function with efficiency. That is why under the original scheme of the 1935 Act, the duty of carrying out the laws relating the subjects included in the Concurrent List was imposed exclusively on the provinces, because this alone could orderly administration of those subjects be ensured. I personally feel and think, that was a prudent arrangement. That was desirable. But all the same, the art of government is a practical one and adjustments have to be made from time to time; only whatever we do must conduce to greater efficiency, to greater economy, to greater public good and greater convenience. All these should be taken into account. So I would not altogether exclude the possibility of sometimes arrangements being made by the Centre for administering the subjects which at present might be included in the Concurrent List. So, so far as the general principle is concerned, I believe, the present Government of India accepts it, that concurrent subjects should ordinarily be administered by the Provinces. It is also, I think, accepted that no change should be made in the present system of administration except with the consent and, if I may say so, the concurrence of the provinces. We on our part, are ever ready to place ourselves at the disposal of the Centre. In fact there is no occasion for any conflict now; and howsoever much one may feel that another course might perhaps be preferable. If the Centre takes a decision, one does not only reconcile oneself to it, but I for one would think that is the only right decision, and I am, perhaps, in the wrong. That may be the case, even with respect to this particular clause. But now when we made the analysis of the provisions of this clause, we found that the reason given for it in the Statement of Objects and Reasons only suggested the appointment of judges of appellate industrial courts in order to settle labour and industrial disputes. Honourable Members might have seen the amendments that I notified previously on the basis of that Statement of Objects and Reasons. I had suggested that in the circumstances, you might make a change in the lists, so as to meet the exigencies of the present situation. When I discussed the matter with the Honourable Home Minister, and the Honourable Minister for Industries and the Honourable Minister for Labour, we found that besides this one matter, there were two or three others also with regard to which they thought that it would be desirable to make some provision, although they had not been mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. So this amendment was recast. On the one hand, it upholds the principle that with regard to concurrent subjects, the executive authority would ordinarily vest in the provinces. On the other hand, it also accepts that there may be occasions when it may be necessary to make a departure, and it may be necessary for the Centre to step in and even to appoint its own agency and machinery. I do not yet know whether the Centre will actually do so. If I may submit with great humility, there are two sides to the shield, and some times, the Centre sees one and the provinces perhaps see the other. So one may look at one side of the shield and not attach any importance to the other side. But the advantages of one side may be more than out-balanced by the disadvantages of the other. So, unless we take a balanced view of the whole thing, it is difficult to say that the next advantage lies in any particular course that might suggest itself to any Honourable Minister who maybe in charge of a particular subject. I do not suggest that in the case of the particular subjects that are mentioned in these amendments there may be such difficulties. But I do think that the basic principle should be adhered to. Otherwise it will lead to confusion. So the position with which some of us were confronted was this, that this Bill had contemplated an over-riding executive authority in the Centre with regard to concurrent subjects. Well, that as I said, seemed to me, to be against the basic principle of the Government of India as well as of the pivotal principle of a federal structure. So some way out had to found. On the other hand there was the experience of the Honourable Ministers at the Centre who had found that their powers with regard to these particular subjects were not adequate enough to enable them to discharge their duties and obligations satisfactorily. So we hit upon this compromise, that with regard to these subjects, the powers should be conferred on the Centre. Now, that power does not by itself enable the Centre to appoint executive agents, but it gives them the option to bring such a measure in this House and if this House approves of it, then it will be open to them to appoint their own agents. I believe that it will still be simpler and easier if they were to appoint the Provincial Governments themselves as their agents for administering these subjects. We are there in the provinces to carry out their wishes to us are no less than behest. Whatever communications we get from the Centre, we try our best to give effect to the directions and even to the hints contained in them and it will be our privilege to do so even in future. I hope, however, that things will be arranged in such a manner that there will be no occasion for any confusion. What I am afraid of is confusion in the matter of administration. In the field of administration there should be no overlapping so far as it can be avoided. The ambit of provincial autonomy has been clearly defined. All the spheres of provincial administration, whether legislative, executive or judicial, should remain untampered with, so that responsibility may be imposed on the provinces and their sense of responsibility may not be impaired. On the other hand, after all, as I said we have to be guided by practical considerations and no theories can be allowed to override the demands of the actual hard realities of the day.
