In this connection, I would like to strike a note of warning. There are several amendments tabled in regard to this question of judiciary which are to be moved by the rump of the Drafting Committee, which are in the nature of an after-thought. For a Professor, it is all very good to envisage a complete separation of the judiciary and the executive. But in actual practice, it might work out in a different way altogether. It might also be that in trying to give the judiciary an enormous amount of power, – a judiciary which may not be controlled by any legislature in any manner except perhaps by the means of ultimate removal – we may perhaps be creating a Frankenstein which would nullify the intentions of the framers of this Constitution. I have in mind the difficulties that were experienced in another country where they have a rigid Constitution, the United States of America, not merely during the time of the New Deal of President Franklin Roosevelt, but also at the time of President. Theodore Roosevelt when the Progressive Party felt that the judiciary was interfering unduly with the liberalizing of the administration. My feeling is that while I have the greatest respect for Dr. Ambedkar’s views on this matter, to put the Constitution of the country in a straight-jacket by giving undue power to the judiciary at a time when we know that in the matter of recruitment to the judiciary, we are not able to get A Class men at all, is unwise. I see instances of judicial officers, Judges of the High Courts becoming administrators, and coming back to the judiciary, because, I suppose, the Government is not able to find sufficient material from the Bar to fill vacancies in the judiciary. It seems in every province the type of people that come up to the top so far as judicial officers are concerned is not about the best that we could possibly get. In these circumstances, this trend of empowering the judiciary beyond all reason and making it a regular administration by itself, will perhaps lead to a greater danger than we can now contemplate. I do not know if at this stage I can appeal to the mover of this amendment to remove the three-year limit, which is superflous and meaningless and which may not be carried into effect, and which would then be a matter of inducing the provincial Governments to flout the Constitution, and allow the view to be expressed as a mere sentiment as other Articles in this Part happen to be. I do not know if Dr. Ambedkar will ever be persuaded, particularly in view of the fact, I think, that the Congress party has approved of the draft in this particular form; but I think there is no harm in pointing out the obvious difficulty in the wording of this particular amendment, which perhaps is otherwise quite unexceptionable.
