Mr. President, Sir, the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar to article 226 undoubtedly requires some explanation. I heard with attention the remarks of my honourable Friend Mr. Pataskar and also of my Friend Mr. Alagesan. The House will realise that the article as amended by Dr. Ambedkar’s amendment seems totally different to the article as it originally stood in the Draft, and the article as it originally stood in the Draft was intended to cover any lacuna that might exist in the distribution of powers wherein it is necessary that the Centre should co-ordinate the activities of the provinces quickly without going through the process indicated by Article 229 and also to cover cases where there is a certain amount of overlapping. The article as it stood originally had also this disadvantage viz., that it sought to put the power over the particular subject which the Centre was attracting, to itself by means of a resolution passed by the Council of States and, so to say, placing it permanently, forever, in the Concurrent List; that was its main defect. When a particular action was taken and the field of provincial autonomy was encroached upon, very necessarily perhaps there must be time limit for the continuance in force of such action. It is no use putting that subject permanently in the Concurrent List. I have no doubt that it is this aspect of the matter that made Dr. Ambedkar give notice of a previous amendment viz., limiting the scope of action that might be taken by Parliament by the authorisation provided in the manner indicated in 226 to a period of three years. There would, according to that scheme, be no objection to renewing it for a further period of three years and also to renew it thereafter provided a certain amount of time is allowed to lapse between lapsing of that particular resolution and a fresh resolution to be moved on the same lines. I do see the force of the arguments of my honourable Friend Mr. Pataskar and the previous speaker in the objections raised by them to the scheme of this article. I am one of those who believes, and believes very firmly, that wherever we assign to the provinces a certain field in which they could act, we must leave the provinces entirely in sole charge of that field, not because of any rigid adherence to theoretical reasons that the federalism adopted by us should be pure and we should not have a mixed kind of federalism such as exists in Canada, but merely because I feel that the responsibilities of Provincial Ministers must be laid squarely on them and there should be no opportunity provided for them to take shelter under the plea of divided responsibility between the Centre and the Provinces. Sir, on this particular point I hold strong views and I do feel that when we consider this whole chapter of distribution of powers we must have that particular fact in view all the time. It does not matter if the powers that are given to provinces do not cover a very wide range. It may be necessary for the Centre to have a larger amount of powers. That does not really interfere with the provinces working smoothly so long as within the scheme of powers allotted to provinces there is no interference from the Centre. Looked at from that point of view, 226 as it originally stood was undoubtedly objectionable that notwithstanding the fact that the Centre is empowered by the Council of States, in which the component States are adequately represented, and that act of empowering the Parliament is by a two-third majority which implied that the States agree to the Centre attracting to itself that provincial power. I do feel that it might conceivably be the thin end of the wedge of the encouragement of the Centre attracting to itself greater powers from the provinces, so that in this process of integration of powers at the Centre for the purpose of uniformity of action in avowedly important matters the general idea that the Centre must have larger powers would come to be accepted. Looked at from the other point of view viz., from the economic objectives to which we are wedded, economic intervention of the Centre become more than a formal necessity-all these facts will undoubtedly work for larger aggregation powers in the Centre at the expense of the States and it is also true that in the other Federations or quasi-Federations as they exist today like U. S. A., Australia and Canada, we find the process of the Centre attracting to itself powers to a greater degree as time goes on is going on rapidly whether constitutionally or by reason of Judicial pronouncements or by the exigencies of time, so much so that we have found a check to this movement of attracting powers to Centre by the adverse vote on the referendum passed by the people of Australia in respect of a demand made by the Federal Ministry for greater powers to Centre for the purpose of executive their post-war plans. There is a lesson to be learnt for us from what has happened in Australia even while the referendum has been backed not by one party but by both parties. Both parties wanted greater power to the Centre but the referendum has unfortunately been negativated. Therefore, it seems to me that in this scheme of distribution of powers which will be supplemented by the financial powers following in a later Chapter, then ultimately by the scheme in the three parts of Schedule VII, we should be very careful to leave to the provinces or, as they are now called, to the States, certain amount of power intact. I would, at the appropriate time, suggest that where it is necessary for the Centre to have powers to co-ordinate action by the various units for vital reasons, it is better to put that subject in the Concurrent List rather than leave it in the States List and at the same time make inroads into field by various other devices. Not merely by the device envisaged in this article but there are other devices as well and there will be time enough for me to deal with those devices at the appropriate time and suggest safeguards against these being used. Therefore, while I do hold that article 226 as it originally stood was objectionable and – if I may borrow a word from the previous speaker-even mischievous, and one that sought to detract from the States the full quantum of responsibility that ought to be with them, I feel that the amendment takes away the substance of this objection against article 226. Again, I can see the argument of my Friend Mr. Paraskar who perhaps might appreciate the necessity for a provision like article 226 but fails to see the necessity for a provision similar to the one that the amendment envisages, particularly in view of there being a subsequent article 229. I am afraid, Sir, that Mr. Pataskar has not appreciated the scope of article 229 which, as will be realised, is a reproduction of a similar section, i.e., section 103, of the Government of India Act. And it is worthwhile, even at this stage, as a comparison has been made between 226 and 229, to find out on how many occasions the provisions of similar section of the Government of India Act have been used. I do recollect that sometime in 1939 resolutions were moved in the various provinces empowering the Centre to undertake legislation in respect of drug control. I also remember, two years back, before the Centre embarked on the Damodar Valley Corporation enactment, two Governments-Bihar and Bengal-had to pass legislation under the powers vested in them under section 103. So, article 229 provides for co-ordinate action in matters in which the provinces are primarily interested, and more often than not, it will happen that only two provinces are interested and an enabling provision is provided so that there may be co-ordinating legislation by the Centre. And it has to be remembered that this process also takes a lot of time. To get a province to move, you want the co-ordinating of the executive, you want the co-operation of the members of the legislature; and it takes a lot of time. And if it did happen that the Centre wanted some powers in respect of an urgent matter where the provisions of the emergency sections need not and could not be involved, naturally there should be some method by which the Centre could act. It may be that some lawyer here might say that since residuary powers are left to the Centre, precedent created by the judgment of the Canadian case-Attorney-General of Ontario versus Canada Temperance Association-might probably be utilised because of the fact that the residuary powers are left to the Centre in this Constitution like the Canadian constitution. But again there is this difficulty, as Prof. K. C. Wheare, an authority on federalism, has pointed out. The very idea of precisely delineating powers that has been undertaken in Schedule 7 of the Government of India Act which we have followed closely and further improved upon in Schedule 7 of the Draft Constitution would not permit room for taking advantage of an interpretation of the residuary powers as meaning that the Centre can interfere in a matter which is avowedly within the province of the State and where the Centre has really no business, except in the public interest, to interfere. So I do believe that there is some utility in article 226 as amended by the amendment moved Dr. Ambedkar which takes away all the sting that might have been attached to the original article or as the article would have been as altered by Dr. Ambedkar’s original amendment. The position as it would be if the article is accepted in its present form is that the matter will have to be brought before the Council of States every year; by way of a resolution so as to keep the Parliamentary enactment made under the authority of the resolution alive. And we have not put a time limit. There is no question of the whole thing lapsing at the end of three years or six years. If the emergency continues one can take it that the Council of States will be responsive enough to realise the need for keeping alive legislation enacted under cover of this resolution and go on extending the life of such enactment by a fresh resolution year after year. We have had experience on the other side of the House of certain enactments which have economic implications being extended year after year by a resolution of the House; and I do not suppose that except for asking questions there has been any serious opposition to giving Government these powers, provided Government convinces the House of the necessity of retaining those powers. At the same time, it preserves a certain amount of freedom of action on the part of the States. If, after the first year perhaps, a snatch vote or something like that enables the centre to undertake legislation which infringes ostensibly and avowedly into the field of provincial autonomy, there is enough scope for the provinces or states to tell their representatives in the council of the states that when it came up for renewal next year they should not renew it. And if at all there is any mischief, it would be only for one year. But it is very unlikely, when the powers are so restricted and are conceded for a year and are to be renewed year by year by a Resolution of the Council of States, that Parliament or the central executive will embark on any action under article 226 without fully satisfying themselves of the need for emergent action, and also at the same time providing against treading on the corns of the Members of the State Legislatures and the executive Government of the States. I feel, Sir, that the balance of advantage seems to be in retaining a provision of this nature as amended by Dr. Ambedkar’s amendment No. 194. The mischief, if at all there is any, is restricted to a very limited period; and the very fact that it is limited to a very short period itself offers no temptation for the Centre using it as a means of augmenting its own power; and if it is used at all, it will be used for a valid and definitely useful purpose to which, by and large, the component States are not likely to object. I felt, Sir, that even though I was taking the time of the House in a matter which did not seem to provoke very much of a controversy at this moment, it is very necessary, in order to dispel mistaken ideas that might exist in the States, that this Draft Constitution has been so framed that it tends to help in attracting all the powers to the Centre, that the field of provincial autonomy left was very restricted. It is to counter this idea that this particular article has been carefully considered, the pros and cons have been fully canvassed and this amendment has been introduced as being such as provides for minimum interference with provincial autonomy and only in cases where the emergency is very great and the safeguards against any mischief are contained in the provisions of the amendment itself. I do hope that the House will accept Dr. Ambedkar’s amendment and the people of the country at large, will be convinced of the bona fides of us in this House whose intentions are to preserve provincial autonomy as far as possible, and to the extent that we have conferred provincial autonomy on the States, to keep those powers intact without undue interference. Sir, I support the amendment.
