Now it is suggested in the proposed amendment No. 24 that Parliament may by law confer criminal appellate powers on the Supreme Court. It is not conceded that Parliament must necessarily confer on the Supreme Court the right of hearing appeals in criminal cases, for the word used is “may” and not “shall”. It is, therefore, intended that it should be left open to Parliament to pass legislation or not, conferring on the Supreme Court the right to hear criminal appeals. The implication of this amendment also is that once this right is conferred on the Supreme Court by legislation, the Parliament may on a subsequent date, if it so chooses, amend, annul or revoke such legislation. That means that so long as Parliament finds that the Supreme Court is passing judgments in appeal which finds favour with Parliament, which means the party in power, which again means the Cabinet for the time being, the Supreme Court shall continue to exercise that right. But when the judgments of the Court are not liked by Parliament the right will be withdrawn. This is a dangerous proposition; it means that the Supreme Court in order to retain that right must act in a manner so as not to displease Parliament. We have been crying for the independence of the judiciary and Dr. Ambedkar has been a stout champion of this independence. But when we come to frame legislation relating to the powers of the Supreme Court which is the highest judiciary in the land we are trying to lay down provision which will virtually strike at the root of the independence not only of the judiciary but of the supreme judicial tribunal in the land. I submit we should not be a party to this. The independence of the Supreme Court in civil cases is not of much consequence; its independence in criminal matters is of vital importance. It matters little if a case involving a paltry sum of Rs. 20.00 is decided this way or that; but if in deciding a criminal case, which sometimes may be of an important political nature, the Supreme Court has to act in accordance with the likings of Parliament in order to retain the power to hear appeals, that is a serious encroachment on the independence of the Supreme Court. In view of all this I submit that we should legislate here and now that the Supreme Court will have power to hear appeals; we should not leave it to the sweet will of Parliament to legislate or not to legislate to that effect. We are in this Constitution providing for a Supreme Court, for the seat of the Court and the salary of the judges and other things in detail. But on the important questions of the right to hear criminal appeals we are leaving it to Parliament to decide as it likes. And which Parliament is going to deal with this? It is the present Parliament or the one which will come hereafter after the new Constitution comes into force? If it is the latter, it means another couple of years. If it is intended that the present Parliament should pass this provision, why should we not do it here and now? The present Parliament consists of members who are present here today. Or, I may say that by the convention we have established it consists not even of the members present here now and who are entitled to take part in these deliberations. Therefore, I think this Constituent Assembly, as the constitution making body, is more representative than the present day Parliament and such an important question should be decided by this body rather than be left to a body which functions as the Parliament. If one likes to be uncharitable an inference may be drawn-though I hope it is not a fact-that some members who are members of this body but under the convention do not attend the Parliament are thought to be so inconvenient that this legislation should be taken up in Parliament where they are not present. We have established a convention that members of the provincial legislatures will not attend this Parliament. Now we wish to tell them that they should agree not to have a say in this matter and should agree to let this matter be decided by Parliament in their absence.
