This practice of distinguishing between votable and non-votable items, or those open to the annual vote of Parliament and those withdrawn from that vote, but permitted to be discussed, is a legacy of the preceding regime, which, I think, was open, and is today still more open, to strong objection. For that regime, no doubt, it can be understood that there were many items of expenditure which it did not care, would not dare, to bring before the representatives of the Indian people. For instance, its huge defence expenditure, or its Home charges, and so on, if open to Parliamentary vote, would never allow the Budget to be passed. But that cannot be an excuse which the authorities of today could hold out for following the same practice. The present Parliament, or the Parliament under this Constitution, would be the supreme financial authority. It would be a sovereign legislative body which ipso facto, should have the right to discuss every item of expenditure and also to vote upon it. In this case, the present article provides that discussion may be allowed; but that on certain items described in the preceding article, which are said to be charged upon the revenues, or are in the Consolidated Fund, there shall be no voting.
