Then there is an amendment to clause (6) which will also seriously affect the Compensation question. This clause says that laws which have been passed with-in one year would be valid notwithstanding clause (2) of this article, i.e. notwithstanding it provides for even no compensation at all. These matters centre round the payment of adequate compensation. If we really do not pay adequate compensation, it will be injustice committed on a large scale and clauses (6) and (4) are so worded as not to give obvious and necessary information. One has to guess the object of these discriminatory provisions. The real purpose has been left concealed. If the principle of compensation is binding on one Province, it should be binding on-all. If any Province has made any law which would contravene this principle, to that extent it should be ultra vires and void. We are inserting article 24 in the Fundamental Rights Chapter and in clause (2) we have provided that whenever any law is passed which contravenes wholly or partly the fundamental principles of these articles, the law would to that extent be void. Why should therefore there be any exception in the case of Provinces which have disregarded the principles of clause (2) ? These principles are immutable and must be respected in all cases, and if there has been any violation it has been a deliberate violation of a sound principle and should not be excused. I submit that the law of compensation should apply to all equally. I regret very much that I have taken a little more time than I might have, but I believe that the case goes without much attention in the House and that is my excuse for speaking at length.
