As the result of a fear of these things, I notice that the following changes have taken place in the framing of the Constitution. The elected Governor came to be replaced by a Governor appointed by the President. Residuary powers which naturally remain with States, if the Constitution was to be really a federal one, have been transferred to the Union. This is wrong in its very conception. I can understand that in a unitary type of Government naturally the residuary powers will be with the Union, because the powers emanate from the Union. But in a federal structure, the powers really emanate from the units and the residuary powers can only remain there. Then, Sir, a curious thing happened. In the First Reading stage we decided that a simple matter like elections in the States should be controlled by the States themselves. But we have now made a provision that they should be controlled also from the Centre (Article 324). Then power was given to the Centre even to legislate for subjects which were assigned to the States List. Financially also, the States will be more or less at the mercy of the Centre. They will derive most of their income from the Centre and they have been provided with very meagre resources of their own. The Governor is no longer merely a Constitutional Head, but has been given powers to interfere in the work of the Ministries. I would only mention in this connection article 167. With the idea of having a strong centre, as if we were continuing under the old Act, many of the problems that urgently needed to be resolved have been kept back.
