Sir, the provisions that I have in view are those relating to the annulment of the financial relations between the Centre and the constituent units in an emergency and the control to be exercised by the Central Government over provincial budgets when the President is of opinion that a financial emergency has arisen there. I do not think that these provisions are called for I have had opportunities of discussing these questions at length and I shall not therefore dilate on them now, but these two articles and the article No. 365 show that our Constitution is over-centralized. Even in the circumstances prevailing in India, it is not necessary that the Central Government should regard the Provincial Governments as its perpetual wards. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor, I believe, was responsible among other things for the maintenance of the financial stability and credit of his province. The Central Government under this Constitution will take the place of the Governor. We have not been content with the re-introduction of Section 93 into our Constitution in a slightly changed form but have also borrowed from that Act in respect of the control to be exercised over democratic provincial governments in regard to their finances. Article 365 in my opinion shows that the provisions of the Constitution relating to the distribution of powers between the Central and State Governments are based on a complete distrust of the provinces. We are trying to usher in an era of full democratic government and yet we begin by distrusting the States, on which it will ultimately depend whether democracy succeeds in this country or not. I fear that the Central Government has taken too much responsibility on itself and that the Constitution may, instead of making the State governments realize their responsibility, will discourage them in the performance of their task and make them feel that they are no more than agents of the Central Government. Such a feeling cannot promote the development of a full sense of responsibility nor can it stimulate the provincial electorates and the legislatures to exercise the supervision that they should in a self-governing country.
