As regards the right to remove a Supreme Court Judge there is deep difference of opinion on this matter. One school of thought is headed by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, who has tabled an amendment that by an address presented by both Houses of the Legislature to the President, any judge or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may be removed from office. The amendment that I have tabled is that it is open to the President to appoint a tribunal consisting of not less than 7 High Court Chief Justices to investigate into this matter and come to a conclusion that the judge or judges ought to be removed for stated misbehaviour or misconduct or similar reason. The President may then remove him. I have also tabled another amendment that a judge may be removed from office by the President on a report presented to him by a panel of judges appointed for the purpose. The objection of Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar is based on the reason that the highest authority so far as judicial work is concerned in the Union will be at the mercy of the executive head of the Union. It is true that the President will act on the report presented to him by a panel of judges, but in that manner the President’s authority is limited. But Sir Alladi thinks that this power ought not to be vested in the President at all, because it will make the Supreme Court judge sub-ordinate to the President. Therefore he has suggested a remedy, that only when the legislature moves the President in this matter by a unanimous resolution, the judge ought to be removed. I have suggested a middle course and have tabled an amendment that any judge of the Supreme Court may be removed from office on an address presented to the President by both Houses of the Legislature but before the address is presented the President must have appointed a committee of seven judges of high courts to investigate into this matter. If they report that the judge in question has committed any breaches for which he is liable to be removed, on that report both the Houses of legislature may present an address to the President or withhold it. Therefore this is a combination of both remedies. The legislature will have control over the removal of a judge and the Power will not be exclusively given to a President or a Panel of Judges. As both houses of the legislature are constituted their number is nearly 600. You will remember that with respect to the removal of the President an amendment was tabled and accepted that when the lower chamber or either of the Chambers initiates a resolution for the removal of the President by way of impeachment, a committee has to be appointed by the other house and on the committee’s report a resolution must be framed. It is in the fitness of things that a small body should go into the matter of the misbehaviour of a Federal Judge and recommend that he be removed. The entire body of the legislature consisting of 600 and odd members may find it difficult to investigate into the matter, themselves. Therefore it is reasonable to suggest that both the Houses must be moved in the matter after a committee of judges has reported that it is a fit case for interference. I am not alone in making this suggestion. The Sapru Committee Report-SIT N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar was a member of the Committee—has suggested that the President, in accordance with the report of the to be appointed for this purpose, may be empowered to remove any judge of the Supreme Court. If Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar takes objection to this item in the Sapru Committee Report on the ground that it becomes an absolute power in the hands of the President to accept or reject, I could see no objection to his accepting my amendment in this respect which is a combination of both the judicial and executive authority.
