Sir, I had tabled an amendment on this clause suggesting its entire deletion which obviously was out of order, and has, therefore, been ruled out. My object in submitting that amend-ment however, was to point out that the whole article sets up a machinery, not only very complicated and likely to give rise to serious disputes as regards the actual number of votes which a State may be entitled to, but which will fail, I submit, in the original purpose for which proportional representation by single transferable vote was devised. Proportional representation by single transferable vote is intended, I submit, to reflect in the legislative body all the shades of political philosophy, all the different interests, all the different opinions that may be found in a country, provided they can muster a given figure, say, 50,000 or 100,000, or whatever may be supposed to be the figure, which is entitled to have its voice heard in the legislative or similar large bodies. Proportional representation, therefore, is not suited, I submit, where the election is of the executive head, and where, after all a single individual is to be elected. I agree that you can work it on a proportional basis by having several candidates, and the votes of the different candidates are transferred from one to another according to the order of preference. That, however, will bring you something to this effect, that your finally elected President was the chosen representative, in the first degree, of let us say one-third: that he was the chosen representative in the second degree about one-tenth, that he was the chosen representative in the third degree–supposing there are three candidates–of one twentieth. This is a minority representative not of a majority.
