Mr. President, Sir, I regret that I cannot accept this amendment by Prof. Shah. If I understood Prof. Shah correctly, he said that the underlying object of his amendment was to secure or rather give effect to the theory of separation between the judiciary and the executive. I do not think there is any dispute that there should be separation between the Executive and the Judiciary and in fact all the articles relating to the High Court as well as the Supreme Court have prominently kept that object in mind. But the question that arises in this: how is this going to bring about a separation of the judiciary and the executive. So far as I understand the doctrine of the separation of the judiciary from the executive, it means that while a person is holding a judicial office he must not hold any post which involves executive power; similarly, while a person is holding an executive office he must not simultaneously hold a judicial office. But this amendment deals with quite a different proposition so far as I am able to see it. It lays down what office a person who has been a member of the judiciary shall hold after he has put in a certain number of years in the service of the judiciary. That raises quite a different problem in my judgment. It raises the same problem which we might consider in regard to the Public Service Commission as to whether a Member of the Public Service Commission after having served his term of office should be entitled to any office thereafter or not. It seems to me that the position of the members of the judiciary stands on a different footing from that of the Members of the Public Service Commission. The Members of the Public Service Commission are, as I said on an earlier occasion, intimately connected with the executive with regard to appointments to Administrative Services. The judiciary to a very large extent is not concerned with the executive: it is concerned with the adjudication of the right of the people and to some extend of the rights of the Government of India and the Units as such. To a large extent it would be concerned in my judgment with the rights of the people themselves in which the government of the day can hardly have any interest at all. Consequently the opportunity for the executive to influence the judiciary is very small and it seems to me that purely for a theoretical reason to disqualify people from holding other offices is to carry the thing too far. We must remember that the provisions that we are making for our judiciary are not, from the point of view of the persons holding the office, of a very satisfactory character. We are asking them to quit office at sixty while in England a person now can hold office up to seventy years. It must also be remembered that in the United States practically an office in the Supreme Court is a life tenure, so that the question of a person seeking another office after retirement can very seldom arise either in the United States or in Great Britain.
